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The Subjects of Semiotics

Giuseppe Mininni

Review-article on Semiotics: An Introductory Anthology, edited with introductions
by Robert E. Innis. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1985.

Every anthology ought to try to get rid of (or at least try to
minimize) the museum-effect, which is inevitably engraved in the
frame of its literary genre; only in this case can we accept its
declared purposes. The museum-effect springs from the break in
the "chronotopos" necessary in the production of any given work.
If many masterpieces are forced to share the space,it is a sign that
their authors have passed the test of time, so that Giotto and
Renoir, Piero della Francesca and Dali can be found together only
in a museum. This effect has been wholly eliminated in this introductory anthology of semiotics edited by Robert E. Innis. This
fact is due not only to the commentary pages that present every
single contribution of the fifteen selected scholars (although certainly these pages help the reader to gradually build up an idea
of how the various questions are linked), but mostly to the work's
unfailing up-to-dateness and the unity of the object investigated in
a semiotic perspective-Le.,
the conditions of sense productionwhich allow Susanne Langer to hold a dialogue effectively with
Schapiro, Thom with Sebeok, and so on.
Il y a du sens: how is it possibleand what are its relationshipswith
man? Nowadays the number of scholars who focus their critical

DIFFERENTIA 2 (Spring 1988)

DIFFERENT/A

278

reflections round this Gordian knot is growing and certainly they
will acknowledge they can draw inspiration from the works of
Peirce and Volosinov, from Morris and Buhler, from Saussure and
Bateson, from Barthes, Benveniste, and Jakobson, just to mention
the names which have already passed into history via the death
of the body, that-as "extrasign residual"-is ruled by the logics
of need and desire. This topic of the "extrasign residual" has
nourished some of the research of another great Italian scholar
who deserves to be remembered here: Ferruccio Rossi-Landi. Innis
too mentions him among the great students who have been sacrificed for editorial reasons, but there is no doubt that the interest
in Rossi-Landi's "philosophical methodics," 1 which penetrates the
sign plot of ideologies and the homology between "semiotics" and
"economics," goes beyond the simple motive of personal gratitude.
This reference to Rossi-Landi' s work has a wider methodological value. Semiotics can also be approached in other ways, as
indeed other similar books demonstrate, but the approach
specified by Innis touches on some really unrenounceable stages,
since it lets what Sebeok 2 calls the "main tradition" stand out.
The unexceptionable principles which Innis (xii) asserts he followed in designing his anthology are: "(1) historical importance,
(2) heuristic fertility, (3) exemplification of semiotic analysis, and
(4) present relevance."
The first idea, it should be emphasized, shapes the existence
of quite a definite and steady frame of reference, within which
different plans of research are developed. These plans have not
always given rise to mutually interlacing theories, for they aim also
at sounding distant spheres of problems such as the logical form of
knowledge and communicative dialogism (Peirce and Volosinov),
the rhetorical (i.e., postlinguistic) techniques that rule the production of (verbal and nonverbal) images (Barthes) and the prelinguistic features of human interactions (Bateson, Sebeok).
The unifying point of view, firmly exhibited by Innis in his
Introductions, focuses the analysis on the semiotic peculiarity,
though not exclusivity, of verbal language among other sign systems, as he is conscious that it may be able to light up what Eco3
labels as "the last threshold of semiotics." In fact, to understand
the relationship between sign and subject has a threshold value,
for it justifies comprehensive interpretations of the cultural structure that defines the nature of man and his existence in the world.
In effect, both alternatives-pointed
out also by other historical
and theoretical monographs 4-€ither between a "semiotics of significance" and a "semiotics of communication" or between a
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"semiotics of code" and a "semiotics of interpretations," confirm
the central position of research into the logical operativity of sign
occurrence (or "semiosis").
The hidden kernel of this twofold option hints at that "last
threshold" of the relationship between sign and subject. The chaotic flow of the status of things is lit up by the appearance of a
novelty: aliquidstat proaliquo(cf. selections from Peirce and Buhler).
Probably every living being, but certainly the animal world, is
governed by this general mechanism of semiosis (cf. Bateson,
Thom, Sebeok). However, when objects (or their properties) are
placed in substituting relationships, with a wealth of "renvois"
or reminders, they undergo a more radical transformation, setting
off ever more complex processes of "representational logic" in a
spiral of unlimited semiosis. When this process is modelled according to the specific articulations of verbal thought, it has been
argued, all formations of the cultural universe may be outlined.
Thus, an affinity, both generic and specific, exists between the
being of man and that of semiosis, for which reason every radical
transformation of the communicative processes induces a reordering of those connections that, in a way which is still largely a
mystery, bind the evolving of higher species to the creation and
internalization of more complex sign systems (see selections of
Eco and Thom).
The "main tradition" of semiotics leads man to think of himself
as a "symbolic animal"; his adaptation to the natural and social
world in forms of cognition takes place in the labyrinth of an
unlimited semiosis, in which each movement is a tentative systematizing "interpretative route," 5 sketching images (selections
from Langer, Barth es, and Schapiro), relying on inferences, elaborating rules, establishing conventions, continually setting up myths
and rites. In any case, in order that man should become aware of
all this, an adequate development of logical philosophical thought
(with Peirce) was necessary, together with a scientific view of the
sign system par excellence of man (with Saussure), and greater
attention given to the communicative processes activated on a
large scale in socio-cultural organization by the violent explosion
of the mass media (see Volosinov and Barthes especially).
The two highest levels at which this series of questions can
be examined are the inner logic of a sign operation (Peirce, Saussure, Buhler, Morris) and the dialogicswhich it sets off (Volosinov,
Buhler, Bateson, Sebeok). It is worth keeping in mind the distinction between these two levels when dealing with certain aspects
of semiosis, since many scholars have found it helpful in making
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more accurate definitions and more subtle classifications. On the
other hand, when dealing with certain other aspects, as has been
revealed more than once in the history of the human sciences, if
the study of the systematic structure of human phenomena is too
far detached from the study of their historical dynamics and the
way in which they are processed culturally, then the results of
such studies will be epistemologically groundless and heuristically
sterile. The "main tradition" of semiotics notes the need to grasp
the being of sign operationsat the moments of their becomingsuch for
the communicativeneedsof man, thematized in this volume especially
by Buhler and Bateson.
Semiotic knowledge challenges the trap of tautological
thought by showing that a sign is anything that functions (or can
function) as a sign. Instead of getting us stuck in the mire of
infinite "regression," such a formulation can project us into the
spiral of unlimited progress (Peirce and Eco). This can provide
the field of reference necessary to anthropological knowledge:
man is what he is capable of becoming, because sign&-to the internalization of which he owes the genesis of himself as subject (see
introductions to Peirce and Volosinov selections)-arise and live
in an array of deferments, i.e., in the interpreter's productive
hypotheses (or "interpretants"). What a sign is depends on the
operation (or series of operations) which it sparks off outside itself,
in its interpreters: it is what the interpreters make of it. This sliding from one ontological plane to another postulated by semiotics,
according to which the explanation of "be" is referred back to the
illustration of "can do," has repercussions on the representational
schemes of anthropology. These schemes attempt to explain the
nature of man's condition in the world, which is at once creative
and precarious, open to innovation and exposed to failure. Man
owes all the potential of his social and historical existence to the
ever-more-complex apparatus of reciprocal reference between
"be" and "can do." Within this general profile, the laws governing
the production of signs reflect and at the same time determine
the modality of man's social (re)production, 6 specified in different
ways by the selections from Buhler and Volosinov.
In the present volume there are frequent allusions to this
idea, although often masked by the treatment of specific questions
such as the semiotic primacy of verbal language (Buhler, Benveniste, Langer), the plurifunctionality of iconic images in cognitive and communicative processes (Langer, Barthes, Schapiro,
Thom), the relationships between systems and within systems
which can be identified in (the type of) semiosic events (see espe-
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dally selection from Benveniste). What I wish particularly to stress
here is that the main principles which inspired this anthological
introduction to semiotics refer clearly to questions raised about
whether it is possible or not to axiomatize human sciences, questions which are more relevant than ever today. In Italy this debate
is strictly linked to the fortune of semiotic knowledge which puts
forward some general hypotheses about what is, or is not, knowable and sayable (as a specific form of the communicable), a problem directly thematized by the Langer selection from Philosophy
in a New Key.
The models of a semiosic event represented in this volume
vary, ranging from those of Peirce and Buhler, which, though
both trivalent, are not the same, to those of Morris and Jakobson,
respectively pentavalent and hexavalent; or from Langer's argument in favor of the opposition of "discursive" and "presentational" forms to Thom's intuition about the "catastrophic" genesis
of cognitive and communicative maps and to the exhibition of the
switching link betwen "figure" and "background" which guides
not only the reflections of Barthes and Schapiro on nonverbal
images, but also those of Eco on verbal images (or "metaphors").
All these models owe their heuristic capacity to the possibility
they give of putting forward new hypotheses about the nature of
a "cognizing being." Semiotics provides a new key to a correct
approach to the question of the nature of knowledge. The old
gnoseological solutions of subjectivism and objectivism, able to
legitimize metaphysical, political, moral and pedagogical theories
in their more general philosophical aspects, refer respectively to
idealism and materialism. These solutions can be replaced by a
concept of signs capable of comprehending the active dynamism
between "knowing subject" and "known object."
Since a "sign is what always allows us to know something
more," 7 it can function as an explicative model of the nature of
knowledge itself, because Knowledgeis also a form of communication
(as the selection from Buhler shows) which, through the medium
of the institution of interpreting signs, attempts to bridge the gap
which has arisen between "subject" and "object." Turning once
more to Peirce's reflections on the transformation by semiosis of
the "dynamic object" into the "immediate object," it can be shown
how the relationship of man with the world is not determined by
the (presumed) existence of "primary data" or "bare facts," but
by a continual process of semiosization, recognized clearly by
Buhler and Eco, among many others, of course. This process sets
in motion a series of circles in which the continued change of
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position between "signifier," "referent," and "interpretant" gives
rise to the productivity (or creativity, or openness) of the system
(see Eco selection on "Semantics of Metaphors"). Reality is captured by and through signs, and it is this which determines the
strength or weakness of human thought; yet philosophy continues, unjustifiably, to consider itself either direct intuition or else a
rigid categorization, a position opposed by all the texts in this book.
However, this apophantic capacity of signs cannot legitimize
the temptation of subjectivism or, worse still, of solipsism, not only
because the pertinent criteria which guide the generation of the
"interpretant" depend on practice 8 (see Volosinov selection) and
undergo intersubjective control in the socially established forms
(from tribal dance to television debate), but also because the operation of semiosis postulates in the referent a "renvoi" to a cognitive
substratum external to the "possible world" which is semiosized
every time. If the "referent" is considered as a pole of semiosis
(or even as "implicit interpretant" 9 ), then studies on man (from
peychology to sociology, linguistics to anthropology) are thus
freed of the temptation inherent in idealism to identify intentionality as the fundamental human feature.
The intentio which characterizes a cognitive event is the mental
"transparency" of the relationship, already at work in semiosis,
of reference (or "renvoi") to something other than itself (see especially the Peirce and Buhler selections). When the fact that man
owes his being to his cognitive hypotheses about the world, to
his own beliefs, to the values which he instituted, to the agreement
reached between himself and others, to the rules implicit in shared
knowledge, is placed on the "threshold of intentionality," 10 it
should not be overlooked that such an "intentional world" reveals
the referential dimension at work in the activation of (a series of)
processes of semiosization.
This "intentional world" becomes a "purposeful world" due to
the semiosic specification of verbal language, which binds man
to the "ethics of discourse" through its universal pragmatic postulates, 11 so that he attempts to reach, in his communicative acts,
various degrees of consent. In verballanguage the sign becomesaware
of itself, directing part of its potential to the metacommunicative
plane in order to allow its users to observe themselves and find
their own role as sense-attributing subjects. The evolution of
characteristics intrinsic to the operation of semiosis is not independent of the conditions in which a certain ecosystem organizes its
life. The activity productive of instruments (or "prostheses") with
which man has amplified and refined his possibilities of interaction
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with the natural and social world, not to mention the activity of
"symbolic play" with which man pursues the phantasms of what
he can do in the Lustfunktion of speaking, together have brought
about the development of verbal language. So high is the level of
semiotic specification thus realized that we may postulate the
autonomy of a "primary modelling system."
In certain of its aspects verbal language can be seen as a sign
system similar to others. However, in certain other aspects it
gathers and fuses characteristics from other systems, while in yet
further aspects it demands specific explicative principles. Like all
sign systems, verbal langauge requires, for example, that in practice interpretation follows instituted rules. These rules, however,
are not generated from a single matrix (as happens in sign systems
formed solely by "indexes," "icons" or "symbols") but accept (almost) every possible reformulation in order to adapt to the expressive and communicative needs of man. This means that language
is not simply a system of signs, since the form (and the "format")
of "representation" interlaces with that of "transfiguration." 12
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